University of Colorado Law School

Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Resource Law Notes: The Newsletter of the
Natural Resources Law Center (1984-2002)

Newsletters

Fall 1994

Resource Law Notes Newsletter, no. 32, fall issue, Aug. 1994
University of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/resource_law_notes
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Energy Policy Commons, Environmental Law
Commons, Environmental Policy Commons, Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, Natural
Resources and Conservation Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Natural Resources
Management and Policy Commons, Oil, Gas, and Energy Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons,
Public Policy Commons, Water Law Commons, and the Water Resource Management Commons

Citation Information
Resource Law Notes: The Newsletter of the Natural Resources Law Center, no. 32, fall issue, Aug. 1994
(Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law).

RESOURCE LAW NOTES, no. 32, fall issue, Aug. 1994
(Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law).
Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson
Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the
Environment (formerly the Natural Resources Law
Center) at the University of Colorado Law School.

Number 32

Fall Issue, August 1994

W ho Governs the Public Lands:
Washington? the West? the Community?
Second Annual Western Lands conference scheduledfor September 28-30
Shifting policy objectives and manage
ment approaches for the public lands of the
West are provoking heated debate about
how these decisions should be made and
implemented. Are these policy directions a
reflection of the “New West” or are they, in
fact, a declaration of “war on the West”?
Somewhere between these polarities of view,
efforts are underway to open dialogue and
reach consensus.
This second annual western lands
conference will explore federal initiatives
including the Colorado Grazing
Roundtable and Rangeland ’94, Option 9
and the Pacific Northwest forests, bypass
flows and Colorado national forests, and
wilderness protection in Utah.
Speakers from federal agencies, from
states, from groups concerned with the use
and protection of the public lands, and
from academia will discuss these initiatives
and issues that they raise regarding control
of the western public lands.
Registration will cost $295 until
September 20; $325 late registration
thereafter. The fee for any level of govern
ment (federal, state, local, tribal) is $225
($255 late). Academics and representatives
of not-for-profit groups may come for $150
($175 late).
NOTE: Because registration will be
limited to 200 people, prepayment or valid
organizational Purchase Orders will be
required.

Inside
Conserving Biodiversity on
Private Land, by Professor
David Farrier, page 5

Secretary o f the Interior Bruce B abbitt (center) is flan k ed by Colorado G overnor Roy Romer (right) an d
Stan Broome o f Montrose, m em ber o f the G overnor’s group, a t m eetings on proposals to raise grazing fees
on p u b lic lands, condu cted in G rand Junction, Colorado, N ovem ber 1993. Photo: Al Gibes, Grand
Ju n ction Daily Sentinel.

Hot Topics Lunch Series Resumes
Implications for developers and for
local governments o f the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in D olan v. City o f T igard
will lead off “Hot Topics in Natural
Resources,” the Center’s popular
Continuing Legal Education lunch series
in downtown Denver,
On Monday, September 19, CU Law
Dean Gene R. Nichol will give an
overview o f the Dolan decision, with
further analysis offered by Tom
Strickland, attorney with Brownstein,
Hyatt, Farber and Strickland, and by
Michael Shultz, Loveland City Attorney.

Hot Topics will again be held in the
32nd floor conference room o f the
Denver law firm Holland & Hart, our
gracious hosts. A registration flyer for the
Hot Topic series will be mailed to the
Denver-Boulder metro area. If you are
outside that area and wish information
about Hot Topics, please call Kathy
Taylor, (303) 492-1288.
The Hot Topic Friday, October 21,
will be on “PUD No. 1 o f Jefferson
County and City o f Tacoma v. Washing
ton Department o f Ecology: The U.S.
contin u ed on page 11

W ho Governs the Public Lands:
Washington? the West? the Community?
Agenda:
Wednesday, Sept. 28, 1994
Decision making and the public
lands
Robert Davis, Institute for Behavioral
Sciences, University o f Colorado

Interest group participation in
public land planning and decision
making processes
Professor Sally Fairfax, College o f
Natural Resources, University o f
California, Berkeley

Constitutional and Congressional
requirements directing public lands
decision making
Professor Joseph M. Feller, Arizona
State University, Tempe

Local and national interests in
using public rangeland: The Colo
rado Grazing Roundtable and
Rangeland ’94
Moderator and overview: Frank
Gregg, Professor Emeritus, W ater
Resources Research, University o f
Arizona, Tucson

The Colorado Process: a view from
inside
Maggie Fox, Sierra Club Southwest
Regional Representative, Boulder
Ken Spann, Y Bar Ranch, Almont,
Colorado (invited)

Rangeland ’94

Lessons from the Pacific Northwest II
Margaret Shannon, University o f
Washington

Local and national interests in
using water on public lands
Moderator and overview: David
Getches, Professor o f Law, University
o f Colorado

Bypass flows in Colorado national
forests
Panel
Doug Robotham, Assistant Director,
W ater Policy, Colorado Department
o f Natural Resources
Skip Underwood, Forest Supervisor,
Arapaho and Roosevelt National
Forests
David Harrison, Attorney, Moses,
Wittemyer, Harrison & W oodruff,
Boulder
Dan Luecke, Regional Director,
Environmental Defense Fund,
Boulder

Michael Preston, Federal Lands
Coordinator, Montezuma County,
Colorado

Putting it together: implications
and directions
Moderator: Judy Jacobsen, Associate
Director, Natural Resources Law
Center
Ed Marston, Publisher, High Country
News
Panel
Maggie Fox, Sierra Club Southwest
Regional Representative, Boulder
Phil Burgess, Director, Center for the
New West, Denver

Stewart Udall, former Secretary o f the
Interior

Overview:
Jeffrey Appels, Attorney, Salt Lake
City
Michael Matz, Executive Director,
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance

Bill Meyers, National Cattlemen’s
Association, Washington, DC

Bill Hedden, Vice-Chair, Grand
County Council, Utah

Thursday, Sept. 29, 1994

Friday, Sept. 30, 1994

Local and national interests in
using public forests

Searching for integration: some
models

Norm Johnson, School o f Forestry,
Oregon State University

Community-Public Lands Partner
ship: The Montezuma County
Federal Lands Program

Moderator: Larry MacDonnell,
Director, Natural Resources Law
Center

Cathy Carlson, National W ildlife
Federation, Washington, DC

Lessons from the Pacific Northwest I

Bill Hedden, Chairman, The Canyon
Country Partnership, Utah

John Lawrence, Staff Director, House i
Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs (invited)

Panel

View from the Forest Service

The Canyon Country Partnership

Local and national interests in
establishing wilderness areas: the
Utah experience

Reactions and critique

Moderator and overview: Charles
W ilkinson, Professor o f Law, Univer
sity o f Colorado, Boulder

Homer Rouse, Superintendent, Rocky
Mountain National Park

(

Moderator: Teresa Rice, Senior Staff
Attorney, Natural Resources Law
Center

Integrating public land and local
community planning objectives: the
Rocky Mountain National Park
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Regulatory Takings and
Resources Conference
Draws Overflow Crowd
The Center’s annual June
conference attracted about 250
registrants and speakers from 31
states, the District o f Columbia, and
two other countries to consider
“Regulatory Takings and Resources:
W hat Are the Constitutional
Limits?” Cosponsored by the law
school’s Byron H. W hite Center for
American Constitutional Study, the
conference was very well received.
The 488 page notebook o f speakers’
outlines and materials, and audiotapes from the 3-day conference are
available (see Publications list page

10).

)

Professor Carol M. Rose, Yale Law School, enjoys the barbeque after delivering
the keynote address Monday.

J o Evans o f the Audubon Society (left) w ith Ruth Wright o f the Colorado
House o f Representatives.

Clyde Martz, attorney w ith Davis, Graham dr Stubbs, Denver, an d fo rm er
Solicitor with the U.S. Dept, o f Interior, expounds on a p oin t w ith speaker
Larry M cBride o f Freedman, Levy, Kroll dr Simonds (left).

Speakers Mark Squillace, University o f W yoming
College o f Law, a n d Brian Gray, Hastings College
o f the Law, relax a t F lagstaff M ountain cookout.

I. M ichael Heyman, Dept, o f the Interior,
Washington, DC, addresses M anagem ent
Approaches to Takings Issues.
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Joh n D. Leshy, Solicitor, U.S. D epartment o f the
Interior, Washington, DC

Center Completes
Report on Water
Banks
In another o f its research projects
examining water reallocation in the West,
the Center has produced a detailed
analysis o f water banking experience
including a recommended framework for
establishing such banks. W ater B anking in
the West provides thorough evaluations o f
water bank experiences in Idaho and
California, the new bank in Texas, and
the recharging o f aquifers as a means o f
banking water. It contains an extensive
examination o f key features o f water
banks and evaluates matters such as price
and allocation from an economic
perspective. A recommended framework
is proposed and then applied against
three banks in the proposal or early
implementation stage: the Lower
Colorado River Interstate Bank, the
Texas W ater Bank, and the Fort Lyon
Canal Bank in Colorado.
Principal investigator for the project,
one o f the last supported through the
United States Geological Survey under
the now defunded W ater Resources
Research Act, was Larry M acDonnell.
Other primary authors include Professor
Charles Howe, University o f Colorado
Department o f Economics; Kathleen
Miller, National Center for Atmospheric
Research; Center attorney Teresa Rice,
and Sarah Bates, now with the Grand
Canyon Trust.
Water Banking in th e West is available
from the Center for $15.

----------------------------------

^ ----------------------------------------------

Associates Breakfast
September 29
Associates who have contributed
to the Center in the past year are
invited to join NRLC staff and
conference speakers for a special
breakfast Thursday, September 29.
If you wish to donate and be
included for the breakfast, please
use the form on page 11 or call
Kathy Taylor at the Center for
additional details.
As always the Center gratefully
acknowledges all those who have
contributed to our support.

I--------------------- ♦

------------ 1

Another Center o f Interest
The Centre for Petroleum and
Mineral Law and Policy established in
19 7 7 at the University o f Dundee,
Scotland is now offering an interdisci
plinary and internationally oriented
graduate studies program focusing on
natural resources, energy and environ
ment. The Centre’s degree programs
combining law, policy, economics and
finance, include diploma, LL.M, MSc
(Energy Studies), M BA (Oil and Gas
Management/Mineral Resources
Management) and Ph.D.
The degree programs are stuctured
in a very flexible way so as to allow
working professionals to participate.

Current research at the Centre focuses
on environmental regulation o f
natural resources/energy; mineral
taxation; EC energy law; international
investment and finance and legislative
and institutional reform in the ex
socialist countries.
The Centre’s Executive Director is
Thomas W alde, Professor o f Petro
leum, Mineral and International
Investment Law, formerly the
principal UN adviser on natural
resources/energy/investment legisla
tion. For more information, please
contact the Centre on Tel. no. +44
382 3 4 4 3 0 0 or FAX +44 382 322578.

Summer ’94 NRLC Research
Assistants
The Center’s active
research program
depends heavily on
the work o f law
school student
research assistants.
This summer the
Center was fortunate
to have five highly
qualified student
assistants.
Paul C ort came to
CU Law School from
a position as an
environmental
C enter RAs jo stle over scarce p h o n e lines in cram ped quarters. From le ft
consultant in San
M ary Beth Searles, P aul Cort, K elly Custer, Eric Fisher a n d M ichael Fife.
Francisco. He holds
both a bachelors and
masters degree in civil engineering.
that a career in natural resource law will
Before entering law school, Kelly
more closely match his personal interests.
Custer worked in Florida and Wisconsin
M ary Beth Searles also has an
as an environmental specialist for state
economics degree, but her work experi
environmental regulatory agencies. W ith
ence has been more as a journalist. As a
degrees in biology and marine ecology,
technical assistant for an energy consult
she worked on wetland regulation and
ing firm, she wrote and edited reports on
mitigation, water quality, and endangered
current energy issues. As Speakers Chair
species.
for the student Environmental Law
Michael Fife’s interest in natural
Society, she will no doubt continue to use
resources, and particularly water issues,
her journalism skills.
grew from his earlier years in Southern
Student research focused primarily on
California. W ith a masters degree in
experience to date in watershed initiatives
philosophy, he is now interested in
throughout the western states and an
environmental issues.
analysis o f efforts to repair environmental
Eric Fisher hales from the New York
problems caused, in part, by Bureau o f
City banking industry, where he put his
Reclamation projects in selected western
economics degree to work. He is hopeful
river basins.

4

Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land
'

David Farrier1

The issue of how we go about persuading
(private landowners to conserve biodiversity is
becoming increasingly pressing. The United
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity,
which entered into force on December 29,
1993, requires parties to “regulate or manage”
species, genetic and ecosystem diversity not
only within protected areas but outside them
as well. The United States is a signatory and
Australia has ratified. At the same time the
message from conservation biologists is that
existing areas of publicly owned land are not
adequate when it comes to the conservation of
representative ecosystems. Land in both the
U.S. and Australia has been reserved or
acquired on an ad hoc basis, with political
factors playing a significant role, and objectives
other than nature conservation (e.g. recreation)
frequently determining the precise areas set
aside. The fact that unrepresented ecosystems
are often located in fragments on privately
owned land means that management by a
centralized agency will be difficult even if we
had the stomach for compulsory purchase.
Where ecosystems have been set aside on
public land, there is increasing concern that
nature conservation is being compromised by
other management objectives, such as
recreation and timber production. This is
hardly surprising, given the fact that for most
public land designations, nature conservation
must compete with other objectives.
Where land is ostensibly being managed for
purposes of nature conservation, management
may still be influenced by competing consider
ations, as where a “hands off’ management
regime allows certain species popular with
tourists or hunters to thrive in the absence of
predators, producing fundamental distortions
in ecosystems.
Even if existing areas of publicly owned
land along with those to be acquired in the
near future, did come to represent the diversity
of ecosystems, they would need also to be large
enough to retain minimum viable populations
of plants and animals. Where ecosystems are
represented on public land, the areas protected
may not be large enough to maintain in the
longer term adequate populations of wideranging large carnivores and herbivores.
At a minimum, biodiversity conservation
calls for corridors over privately owned land
linking areas of protected land together, to
allow species to migrate between them. Unless
substantial buffers are provided, large
protected ecosystems in public ownership will
always be vulnerable to edge effects stemming
from increased exposure to sunlight and other
spillovers from surrounding areas. These
buffers will frequently have to be on land in
private ownership.
Yet the provision of buffer zones around
core areas and wildlife corridors connecting
them, may be a futile gesture in the longer
term. There is increasing evidence that global

D avid Farrier
warming will have dramatic effects on
ecosystem boundaries as the relative speed of
temperature shifts in comparison with changes
in the past, leaving vegetation with insufficient
time to adapt. The implications of global
warming are that we can no longer take a
segmented approach to biodiversity conserva
tion, with nature conservation ghettos
interspersed within a landscape devoted to
commercial production.
My concern is with the policy instruments
required to modify the behavior of private
landowners. Market forces generally provide
private landholders with little incentive to
conserve biodiversity, and where market
incentives do exist, such as hunting or
recreation, they may produce distortions in the
way in which ecosystems are managed and end
up actually diminishing diversity.
1 will consider in turn the use of incentive
schemes designed to induce biodiversity
conservation under the Farm Bills and private
conservation easements; command and control
regulation; and the use of management
payments as an alternative to compensation in
the context of regulation.

Conservation by consensus under
the Farm Bills
Governments may operate in the market
place themselves, not by purchasing title to
land but by purchasing land use restrictions
designed to conserve biodiversity. These can

1Professor David Farrier (LL.B. London
School of Economics; Diploma in Criminology,
Cambridge University; LL.M. Columbia
University) is a Visiting Research Fellow with
the Natural Resources Law Center, JanuaryOctober 1994, on sabbatical from the University
of Wollongong Faculty of Law, Australia.
This is an edited version of a paper which
will eventually be issued as a Center Occasional
Paper. Prof. Farrier welcomes requests for his
full draft paper for comment.
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take the form either of simple contractual
agreements, or conservation easements which
will bind all who obtain title to the land in the
future.
There are a number of examples of such
schemes in the United States. The Environ
mental Conservation Acreage Reserve Program
(ECARP) consists of the conservation reserve
program (CRP) and the wetland reserve
program (WRP). The CRP is by far the most
significant government commitment to
environmental programs in terms of resource
allocation. Over 36,400 acres were enrolled in
the first twelve sign-ups, representing a total
financial commitment by the Federal Govern
ment of over $19-5 billion, and an annual
commitment peaking at $1.9 billion in 1996.
In Colorado there are 6,207 contracts covering
nearly 2 million acres and involving a total
financial commitment of nearly $1 billion.
(Kenneth A. Cook, So Long CRP, Environ
mental Working Group, 1994, 4-5, 18, 22).
The origins of the CRP lie in concerns
about the overproduction of certain agricul
tural commodities and land degradation. Only
after 1990, with the expansion of eligible
categories of land beyond highly erodible
cropland to include croplands to be devoted to
permanent wildlife habitat has the program
become marginally more sensitive to the
demands of biodiversity conservation, in the
form of “wildlife” conservation.
The CRP relies primarily on contracts,
which are more vulnerable than easements.
Moreover, contracts are ordinarily only for a
period of ten years, although this can be
extended to a period of fifteen years where the
land is devoted to hardwood trees, shelterbelts,
windbreaks, or wildlife corridors. The CRP is
essentially a short-term land retirement
program, and significant problems are
anticipated when the first batches of enrolled
land come out of contract in 1995Under the terms of the CRP contract, an
approved conservation plan must be imple
mented, and this may include a requirement
for the establishment of permanent wildlife
habitat. Highly erodible cropland must, for
example, be put under “approved vegetative
cover, or water cover for the enhancement of
wildlife.”
The CRP suffers from all the shortcomings
of a program which has had tacked on to it a
thin veneer of concern with biodiversity, after
starting out its life with very different
objectives. The Wetlands Reserve Program, on
the other hand, is more directly relevant to
biodiversity conservation, although its impact
is confined to a narrow category of ecosystems.
The WRP is concerned with restoring to
their original condition wetlands which have
been modified by agricultural activity or
completely converted, before December 23,
1985. The likelihood and cost of restoration
must be taken into consideration in deciding

which areas to enroll. The owner of the land
must be prepared to grant a perpetual or 30
year easement* or for the maximum duration
allowed by State law. Priority is to be given to
easements based on the value which they have
for protecting and enhancing habitat for
migratory birds and other wildlife.
The focus of the CRP and the WRP is on
converting existing intensive land uses to more
environmentally sensitive uses by restoring
land already in agricultural production, rather
than seeking to dissuade landholders from
converting land to more intensive uses in the
first place. There is a powerful argument that
we would do better to concentrate limited
resources on conserving relatively undisturbed
land rather than attempting to restore
degraded or even destroyed ecosystems.
The retention of relatively undisturbed
areas is addressed by the Sodbuster and
Swampbuster provisions of the Farm Bill.
Sodbuster threatens farmers with loss of
agricultural program benefits where any
agricultural commodity is produced “on a field
on which highly erodible land is predominate”,
unless this is in accordance with an approved
conservation plan. The focus here is squarely
on the prevention of land degradation (land
conservation) rather than the conservation of
biodiversity. The operating assumption is that
highly erodible land can be brought into
production, with biodiversity substantially
destroyed in the process, as long as there is a
conservation plan in place, designed to
conserve the land base rather than its
biodiversity.
Swampbuster also threatens landholders
with loss of program benefits, the relevant
event here being conversion of a wetland “for N
the purpose, or to have the effect, of making
the production of an agricultural commodity
possible”. There is no equivalent to the
substantial exemption under the Sodbuster
provisions which allows cropping on highly
erodible land to go ahead provided that it is in
accordance with an approved conservation
plan. In spite of this, Swampbuster, has
fundamental shortcomings when it comes to
biodiversity conservation.
First, it has nothing to say to those
converting wetland for purposes other than
cropping. Only the command and control
provisions of section 404 of the Clean Water
Act (see below) stand in the way of the same
landholder selling the same land for real estate
development, or putting it to pasture and
destroying most of its biodiversity value in the
process. Secondly, Swampbuster has no hold
over landholders who do not grow program
crops or are prepared to forego program
'benefits.
Thirdly, to landholders accustomed to
receiving program benefits and dependent
upon them, it presents as coercion. If we look
beneath Swampbuster’s rhetoric of command
and control, we find an entirely voluntary
program, offering program benefits on certain
conditions. But this is not how landholders
perceive it. The result is that Swampbuster has
all the disadvantages associated with command

and control regulation - landholder hostility
and enforcement problems - and none of the
advantages possessed by policy instruments
which tempt with carrots rather than beat
with sticks.
Finally, imposing land use restrictions is
only the first step towards biodiversity
conservation: particularly where ecosystems
comprise fragments, active management is
required, especially in relation to external
impacts. Swampbuster does not allow for the
payment of incentives to landholders for
ongoing management of ecosystems.
Management is perhaps even more crucial
in relation to restored ecosystems. Both the
CRP and the WRP, in addition to offering
compensation, provide for cost share in
relation to the in itia l establishm ent o f
conservation measures. However, manage
ment payments are not contemplated under
the CRP, except where land is to he set aside
for the production of hardwood trees,
windbreaks, shelterbelts or wildlife corridors,
when payments for maintenance can be made.
Only the WRP requires landholders to make
long-term commitments in easements to
manage restored wetlands in accordance with
a conservation plan, and appears to contem
plate that they will receive cost-share
payments for this.

Conservation through private
agreement
Apart from government initiatives to
influence land use through agreements with
landholders, activities on a growing area of
land in the United States are regulated
through agreements reached between
landholders and private nonprofit organiza
tions, such as the Nature Conservancy and
land trusts.
Legal requirements for a valid conservation
easement vary from state to state. For present
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purposes, however, it can be taken as an
agreement regarding land use, designed to
protect natural resources, binding not only on
the original landholder who agrees to the
obligations, but also on those who hold title to
the land thereafter.
Allowing conservation easements to be held
by publicly non-accountable private organiza
tions is alleged to conflict with the policy that
landholders should be able to shift land uses
according to current market choices. This
ignores the fact that development places
irreversible dead hand ties on land by
substantially confining the uses to which it can
be put through p h ysica l modification, by
degradation and destruction of ecosystems.
Those who restrict development through
easements actually keep open options for
future generations, the reality always being that
future law-makers cannot be bound by prior
lega l arrangements.
On the other hand, the number of land
trusts taking conservation easements on an ad
hoc basis, with their disparate objectives,
creates difficulties for any attempt to produce
integrated and coordinated planning in this
area. At present the only means by which these
arrangements are made publicly accountable is
through the tax system, which often provides
the incentive to landholders to enter into an
easement.
Land management objectives adopted by a
particular trust may conflict with desirable
land use from a public interest perspective. For
example, an easement may be taken over land
in order to gain or maintain public access, or
even to preserve it as farm land, when the
public interest could require restrictions on
access, and restoration of ecosystems.
Provision for ongoing management of the
land is another crucial issue. There is a danger
that particular land trusts may end up
focusing on bringing land under conservation

easement, with little attention paid to
continuing stewardship responsibilities. Apart
from this, where small local organizations are
involved, they will simply not have the
expertise to set up and implement the detailed
monitoring and management mechanisms
| required to promote biodiversity conservation.
Finally there is the matter of enforcement.
Land trusts emphasize voluntarism. Formal
legal proceedings are seen very much as a last
resort. The fact that a program starts out in the
realm of consensus, however, does not mean
that at a later point it may not confront the
landholder as coercion. This becomes
increasingly likely where the landholder who
originally granted a conservation easement sells
the land.
The Nature Conservancy emphasizes that if
the issue of enforcement comes up, it is already
too late because the damage has been done,
and restoration is extremely difficult or
impossible. Although easements are moni
tored, this is usually only possible on an annual
basis, and the main emphasis is placed on
maintaining good relationships with landhold
ers to forestall transgressions.
The Nature Conservancy, in a special
position because of its size and levels of
expertise, currently holds nearly 600 conserva
tion easements, generally designed to protect
endangered species and natural communities
which occur on privately owned land. Areas
are identified by using information from the
Conservancy’s Natural Heritage Programs elaborate inventories of the biological and
ecological features of a particular region - and
selected for protection by an elaborate ranking
| system.
The primary aim of the Conservancy’s
easements is to protect land from development
pressures which will degrade or destroy existing
ecosystems; it is particularly concerned to
restrict real estate development. While
conservation easements reserve a right of entry
to the Conservancy to monitor ecosystems and
compliance with the terms of the agreement,
management arrangements are generally left to
be negotiated on an ad hoc basis.
A private organization such as the Conser
vancy has the unique advantage of being able
to negotiate with private landholders against
the backdrop of government regulation, while
still remaining committed to a philosophy of
voluntariness and cooperation. The existence
of command and control legislation, such as
the Endangered Species Act, may, for example,
play a vital role in bringing landholders to the
bargaining table. By contrast, government will
never be able to escape completely from its
regulatory persona even where it approaches
with offerings rather than threats. Currently,
therefore, Nature Conservancy activities on
private land provide a valuable adjunct to
government initiatives.
However, any program, whether govern
ment or private, which is fundamentally reliant
on voluntary cooperation from landowners will
inevitably suffer from problems of non
cooperation. Ecosystems cut across property
boundaries. Remnants are scattered across the

landscape. By refusing to cooperate, one
person with a strategic landholding can
effectively destroy a wildlife corridor or leave a
destructive gap in a buffer zone. For those who
will not cooperate with voluntary initiatives,
there will have to be a regulatory fall-back
position.
On top of this, it is unlikely that there will
ever be enough resources either from private or
public sources to enable the demand for
biodiversity conservation to be met through
free market solutions. It remains crucial that
regulations continue to set the parameters
within which negotiations are conducted and
bargains reached, and that they take.a form
which ensures that the focus of those negotia
tions goes beyond land use restrictions and
addresses the question of management.
The command and control alternative
Both the “take” provisions of section 9 of
the Endangered Species Act, and the wetlands
protection provisions of section 404 of the
Clean Water Act set up command and control
regulatory systems, subject to individually
permitted exceptions.
Under the Clean Water Act, it is unlawful
to “discharge ... dredged or fill material” into
“navigable waters” without a permit. These
concepts have been interpreted generously so
as to prohibit a wide range of activities on a
broad range of wetlands. The Corps of
Engineers has the primary responsibility for
issuing permits, but in doing so, it is required
to apply Guidelines developed by the EPA in
conjunction with the Corps. On top of this,
the EPA has a power of veto over the grant of
permits.
The direct relevance of the Endangered
Species Act to private landholders stems from
the fact that section 9 makes it unlawful to
“take” a species of fish or wildlife listed as
endangered, anywhere in the U.S., unless an
incidental take permit has been granted under

section 10. It has been held in decisions by the
courts, with one recent notable exception, that
significant habitat modification or degradation
will constitute a taking of a species. This
potentially constitutes a significant limitation
on private land use. On the other hand, it is
only unlawful to damage or destroy plants on
private land where this involves a knowing
breach of state law.
At first sight, the prohibitive commands of
these two pieces of legislation look impressive
indeed. Experience teaches us, however, that
where the commitment of the community to a
legal obligation is equivocal, as here, where
land use regulation in the interests of environ
mental conservation clashes with deeply held
values about the sanctity of private property,
regulatory hernias will inevitably develop as
agencies search for some level of “flexibility” to
enable them to survive politically.
What “flexibility” means in practice is
allowing projects to go ahead with conditions
designed to mitigate environmental impact
attached to them, as distinct from simply
saying “no”. This approach may be acceptable
when we seek to prevent land degradation or
to protect water quality: for example, the
threat of soil erosion can frequently be
prevented by requiring land cleared of native
vegetation to be immediately sown with
pasture. But it frequently will not go far
enough where our objective is conservation of
biodiversity.
In this context, we may need a paradigm
shift, so that the question becomes what level
of development is compatible with the
conservation of biodiversity, not how can we
retain the maximum level of biodiversity
consistent with development. The answer in
many, cases may be “none”. At present the
focus of regulatory systems is on how can we
manage to allow development to proceed on a
particular site, not on w hether we. should allow

Foothills prairie burning o jj m ow ed lines. Photo courtesy o f The N ature Conservancy.

it to proceed there, or even at all.
Under section 404 of the Clean Water Act,
the regulatory net has been drawn wide, but
the crucial question is how the permit system
operates in practice. At one level, a substantial
degree of precaution has been built into it.
Under the Guidelines which the Corps of
Engineers must apply, a permit must be
refused if there is a practicable alternative
which would have less adverse impact on the
aquatic ecosystem and would not have other
significant adverse environmental conse
quences. Where a project is not waterdependent, the burden of proof is actually
.reversed, so that it is presumed that practicable
alternatives not involving wetlands are
available.
Despite this, there are consistent allegations
that section 404 is failing to stem the flow of
wetland conversion. One prominent device
used by the Corps to enhance “flexibility”, for
example, was the “mitigation-buy-down”. This
allowed it to grant a permit on the basis of
compensatory mitigation - the offer of restored
or created wetlands at another site - without
first considering the possibility of complete
avoidance (e.g. by finding an alternative site)
or minimization of environmental impact.
This practice has now been abandoned and
the Corps is committed to a sequencing
process, whereby compensation of wetland
values only becomes an option after potential
impacts have been avoided to the maximum
extent practicable, and those which cannot be
avoided have been minimized.
In spite of this apparent downgrading of
mitigation through compensation, the
suspicion remains that wetland compensation
is going to provide the technological fix and
the “flexibility” which will allow development
to proceed in most cases. Provided that
practicable alternatives in the form of
avoidance and minimization have been fully
explored, there is a strong suggestion that

normally the go-ahead will be given on the
basis that loss of wetland values and functions
will be compensated.
This suspicion is reinforced by the Clinton
Wetlands Plan of August 1993, with its firm
endorsement of the use of mitigation banks.
The Plan is as much about protecting
landholders from regulatory burdens as it is
about protecting wetlands from landholders.
It is one thing to espouse the restoration of
degraded wetlands, or even the creation of new
ones, as a means of recovering in some small
way the values and functions which have
already been lost. It is quite another to
advocate restoration and creation as devices to
excuse and legitimate the continued destruc
tion of wetlands in relatively undisturbed
condition. The science of wetland’s mitigation
is still in its infancy, and the creation of
wetlands substitutes are frequently not
successful. Common sense suggests that some
functions of wetlands may be more difficult to
restore or create than others, and that habitat
would be prominent on this list.
The permit system for allowing incidental
takes of listed species under the Endangered
Species Act is located in section 10. As under
section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the
provisions are framed in precautionary terms.
They include a requirement that the applicant
must submit a conservation plan. Before
granting a permit, the Secretary of the Interior
must be satisfied that the applicant will
minimize and mitigate the impacts of the
incidental take “to the maximum extent
practicable”, that adequate funding for the
plan will be provided, and that there will be
procedures to deal with unforeseen circum
stances.
In this case, unlike section 404, the permit
system has, in fact, operated quite tightly. Very
few conservation plans have been completed
and very few incidental take permits have been
issued.
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However, the legislation has built into it
other opportunities for front-end regulatory
slippage, in particular the process by which a
species gets on to the list in the first place.
Even though the prohibition on taking species
bites like a pit bull when it does bite, the
reality is that its protective bite is very
selective. It impacts only a narrow class of
species which have been identified after a very
cautious, careful and relatively lengthy forward
planning exercise.
One of the fundamental problems with the
listing process is the way in which it deals with
the question of scientific uncertainty. Many
species are not listed because of the high degree
of scientific proof demanded and the resources
needed to gather it. A precautionary approach,
on the other hand, requires us to carry out
protective action even though the conservation
status of a species cannot be proved according
to traditional cannons of scientific proof. The
argument is that it is better to put up with
false positives rather than false negatives where
we are dealing with irreversible effects. When
it comes to facilitating development on
wetlands by allowing compensatory mitigation,
it is strange that we are much less concerned
about the scientific uncertaintly associated
with wetlands creation and restoration.
Even where a decision has been made that a
listing is warranted, its formal processing can
still be delayed because other pending listing
proposals are seen to be more urgent, although
a recent court settlement promises to address
this situation.
Ultimately, these problems stem directly
from the narrow species focus on which the
legislation rests. How can we, for example,
expect to produce scientific proof of the
conservation status of the many invertebrate
species not yet known to science? If the focus
was on threatened and endangered ecosystems,
it would be very much easier to satisfy even a
very demanding burden of scientific proof. In
other words, the heart of the problem
ultimately lies with the level of the environ
mental unit on which science is expected to
focus rather than the demand that science be
allowed to play a role in the decision-making.

Incentives: compensation or
management payments?
The question which must be asked is
whether command and control regulation by
itself can hope to address the issue of
biodiversity retention and management on
privately owned land. A wise policy response
would move away from exclusive reliance on a
coercive approach and seek to attract greater
cooperation from private landholders. At the
same time, it is clear from the earlier analysis
of strategies based on voluntary agreement
between landholders and the public or private
sector that parameter-setting command and
control regulation cannot be abandoned
altogether.
An alternative strategy involves combining
regulation with the provision of compensation
in those situations where controls actually bite.
From one perspective, this is already the

position in the United States. Under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, private land
use regulation at a certain level of impact must
be accompanied by just compensation. But
compensation is only available grudgingly, on
an ad hoc basis through the courts, and the
Outcome is difficult to predict. The result is
that the regulatory system loses all of the
advantages of a system capable of softening the
blows of the stick by offering an easily grasped
carrot.
In Australia, environmental and natural
resources legislation bearing on private land
emanates primarily from the states, rather than
the Commonwealth Parliament. But there is
nothing in any of the state constitutions which
guarantees compensation for landholders, even
in situations where they are totally excluded
from their land by State action. Section
51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution
does provide that any “acquisition” of property
by instrumentalities of the Commonwealth
Government must be made on just terms.
However, in the Tasmanian Dam case
{Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR
1), three of the four members of the High
Court who dealt with the issue made it clear
that even the severe regulatory restrictions on
land use in Tasmania imposed under the
World Heritage Properties Conservation Act
of 1983 did not constitute an “acquisition”
requiring the payment of compensation.
The absence of a constitutional guarantee
of compensation for regulatory takings in
Australia does not prevent debate about
whether compensation should be paid, but the
primary forum is Parliament. If a decision is
made to pay compensation, it will be the result
of a general formula worked out in the context
of particular legislation. This contrasts with
the position in the United States where not
only the question of the amount payable, but
the prior issue of whether compensation
should be paid at all, is addressed through case
by case decisions, made ultimately by the
highest court in the land.
In fact provision for compensation is rarely
made in Australian land use legislation. One
significant exception to this is of particular
relevance to biodiversity conservation. The
South Australian Native Vegetation Manage
ment Act of 1985 prohibited land clearing and
woodcutting without consent from the Native
Vegetation Authority, subject to a number of
exemptions, including grazing by domestic
stock and clearance of regrowth and shrub
invasion in certain circumstances. Where an
activity was not exempt, owners of land who
were given a conditional approval or were
refused consent could generally insist on the
Minister entering into a heritage agreement.
Once this had been concluded, the landholder
was entitled to the payment of “a sum of
money” based on diminution in the market
value of the land.
The most notable effect of this approach
was a significant tightening in the granting of
permits. Of the total area for which applica
tions were made between 1986 and 1989

involving broadacre clearing, about 94% was
protected by outright refusals. This compared
with a figure of 80% approvals under the
previous regulatory system, which relied solely
on command and control.
This suggests that the availability of some
form of recompense may make it easier for
regulatory agencies to say “no” to develop
ment. The hypothesis is that they are less likely
to search for the “flexibility” which they
manage to find in command and control
regulation when they are in a position to
soften the blow of outright refusal by offering
something in return.
In addition, the availability of some sort of
financial return will inevitably make landhold
ers less hostile to restrictions on land use and
make enforcement easier. Besides, manage
ment is required, and disgruntled landholders
make poor managers.
The real issue is not whether landholders
should receive some form of financial payment
in conjunction with command and control
regulation, but what form that payment should
take. By providing compensation for losses, we
allow landholders to externalize the problem
and deny that they have any responsibility for
the conservation of biodiversity. Compensa
tion is backward-looking and has nothing to
say about the matter of future management of
the land. Instead of landholders being given
some degree of ownership of the issue of
biodiversity conservation and a real stake in
addressing it, we allow them to wash their
hands of it.
Unlike compensation, management or
stewardship payments are forward looking and
are based on work carried out by the land
holder rather than on the market value of the
land. They are more equitable than compensa
tion insofar as they constitute payment for
worlt performed, as opposed to being based on

what are frequently chance factors relating to
the development value of land. A strategy
which offers management payments to
landholders will be particularly appropriate in
situations where the conservation of remnant
vegetation is at stake, and agricultural
landholders want to remain on the land, even
though their existing operations are marginal.
Management must take into account the
singularities of each piece of land in light of
the complexity of ecosystems and the fact that
our current knowledge is very limited. From
this perspective, building on to the knowledge
base of individual landholders, advised and
supported by the expertise of government,
might prove to be a more efficient strategy
than handing over complete management
responsibility for scattered patches to govern
ment agencies.
Claims for compensation on the grounds
that a “taking” under the fifth amendment has
occurred would not likely succeed if govern
ment was prepared to pay landholders to
manage land for the purposes of biodiversity
conservation, thereby providing an economi
cally beneficial use.
Paying farmers and pastoralists on marginal
land to manage it for biodiversity conservation
would provide an alternative form of income
support to agricultural price support schemes.
Society is simply supporting the production of
an alternative commodity - biodiversity.

Conclusion
The argument which has been made is that
neither fully voluntary nor command-andcontrol programs are likely to achieve
meaningful conservation of biological diversity
on private land. An amalgam of a commandand-control regulatory framework and a farreaching program of management payments to
landholders for the production of biodiversity
is proposed.
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Hot Topics (continued)

CU Law Students Frank
Wilson (left) a n d
K athryn M utz had their
names engraved on the
Colorado Bar A ssociation’s
plaque honoring those
who have won the CBA s
annual M ineral Law
w ritin g com petition. At
right is Joh n Henderson,
chair o f the M ineral Law
Section. Frank Wilson
also received the 1994
D istinguished N atural
Resources Law Graduate
aw ard at the University o f
Colorado School o f Law.

Supreme Court Decision and Implications
for Colorado’s §401 Program.” Speakers will
be Barbara Green, of Hale, Pratt, Midgley,
Hackstaff & Goldberg; Marcia Hughes,
Denver attorney; and Paul Frohardt,
Administrator, Colorado Water Quality
Control Commission.
The final program of the fall, scheduled
for Tuesday, November 15, will be “What
Coloradans Need to Know about Develop
ments in the Lower Colorado River Basin.”
Speakers will be Jim Lochhead, Executive
Director of the Colorado Department of
Natural Resources, and Center Director Larry
MacDonnell.

Public Land Law Review
Commission Reports Donated
to Center

M arvin Wolf, long
tim e Center
benefactor, enjoys a
laugh w ith CU Law
Dean G ene R. N ichol
(left) a t C enter’s sem i
annual Advisory
Board meeting.

The Center would like to acknowledge the
donation by Eleanor Schwartz, Chief,
Division of Legislation and Regulatory
Management, Bureau of Land Management,
of her personal copies of 33 studies prepared
for the Public Land Law Review Commission
in the early 1970s. These 33 studies provided
the basis upon which the Commission made
its recommendations to Congress in One
Third o f the Nation's Lands. The Center
reports will he made available through the
University of Colorado Law School library.
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Expiration date

Signature
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Q Please note new address marked on mailing label on reverse
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□ Please delete the address marked on mailing label on reverse
side
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